中國時報 2008.06.17
以仲裁解決周邊衝突
李復甸
台灣在國際定位不明，承認台灣國際法人格日益窘迫之現實下，如何保護國民在領域外之權益，是最令政府困擾的課題。國人在大陸投資糾紛層出不窮，漁民四鄰捕魚也時有糾紛產生。近來更因釣魚台海域作業，漁船被日本海上保安廳巡邏艇撞沉，愈益凸顯解決糾紛機制之需要。
此次撞船事件顯然已不是一般的司法案件。就刑事案件言，日昨日本宣布巡邏艇長與台灣漁船船長均觸犯日本刑法一二九條過失往來危險罪，移送地方檢察廳偵辦。非但與事實相差極遠，且意圖敷衍國際壓力，事至為明顯。若就民事案件言，即使用訴訟方式進行，除了曠日費時外，還有國家豁免等複雜議題。日本無意依法公平處理此事，在國際法上已構成拒絕正義（Denial of Justice）。
因我國已非國際法庭會員國，要在海牙提起訴訟幾乎已無可能。但日本武裝艦隻以懸殊的噸位差蓄意撞擊，已符合違反「國際刑事法院羅馬規約」所定，故意指令攻擊平民，且故意指令攻擊民用物品，是嚴重國際武裝衝突行為。日本為「國際刑事法院羅馬規約」簽字國。受害船長可向國際刑事法院要求檢察官逕行調查其行為，但其可行程度亦低。
因此，國際法上所謂當地救濟途徑窮盡（Exhaustion of Local Remedies）在台灣周邊地區甚難適用。劉兆玄院長所言，爭議要用開戰是最後的階段，確是國際法所規定。但以台灣的國際情勢幾乎沒什麼選擇，就到了unjustifiable無可挽回的地步。因而尋求仲裁作為糾紛解決替代，是較為可行的機制。
仲裁的彈性最大，不牽涉國家承認問題。只要雙方同意作成仲裁協議（compromis d’arbitrage）便可經由仲裁解決糾紛。如一九一○年紐芬蘭漁案（the Newfoundland fisheries case）、一九二三年的狄諾柯仲裁案(Tinoco Arbitration)、一九七三年英國石油公司與利比亞仲裁案（B.P. Exploration Company v. Libyan Arab）、一九七七年的英法英吉利海峽礁層案、二○○○日本與紐澳間藍鰭鮪仲裁案等。 美國與英國更因卡尤佳印第安人（Cayuga Indian Arbitration），常年有仲裁處理糾紛。其中爭端的一方甚至可以是私人公司，而非國家。仲裁可有固定機構如海牙的常設仲裁法庭（Permanent Court of Arbitration）、投資糾紛調解中心（ICSID）。也可以因個別糾紛而組成個案仲裁（ad hoc Arbitration）。
釣魚台問題不能忽視其主權爭議之本質。不可能只談入漁，而不談領土主權。我立法院早在民國八十七年通過「領海及鄰接區法」，大陸更在一九九二年通過「領海及毗連區法」，至今均未具體進行海域劃界。其中牽涉複雜，固無需因撞船事件繼續升高衝突，但亦應設法避免駝鳥式的衝突處理。三邊共同組成仲裁機構，或個別進行仲裁，應是處理釣魚台糾紛的可行方式。
2008年6月17日 星期二
以仲裁解決周邊衝突
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3 則留言:
李復甸委員，我希望你可以做考試院長，姚嘉文
什麼垃圾東西，一句話， 自作孽不可活．
關於釣魚台，仲裁應該是不可行
http://ca.youtube.com/watch?v=17N3JLNJnco
馬總統Harvard SJD 的學位其實現在對我們台灣人民是很有價值的．．．但是看了張友驊說了的話，仲裁是遠水救不了近火了，在明年重新談判航權前無法得到解決，除非李教授作為一位仲裁權威有更好的方式．
的確，正義很重要，而日本知道理虧，我想他們該賠償應該也不會太過分．問題是主權還是無法解決．看的出來馬總統其實內政外行，可是似乎外交這種需要虛實的戰役是滿有拿捏的．
我認為，台灣是需要在美日中三方斡旋才能生存．所以我覺得剩下的只有兩個選擇，一是在開採東海石油時靠大陸給我們一點東西，二是用大陸綁架日本．我現在終於了解為什麼馬總統用賴幸媛了．
http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1006/4/1/0/100641072.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100641072
其實，現在和平解決，也是好事，用小抗爭來爭取中國信任，但不以戰艦示威來破壞跟日本的友好關係．但是到了明年要重新談海權的時候，還是要攤牌的．但是我看馬總統大概已經做好決定了．仲裁是以退為進的棋子，但是怎麼樣可以做到在礦產開採工程上拿到主導權才是最重要的．可以在中日兩方外有另外一個選擇嗎?軍購佔３% of GDP是無法完全買到美國人的信任，開採石油美國航空母艦就在旁邊，所以怎麼樣讓台灣可以利用美國來提高台灣的籌碼才對．美國人覺得應該給誰才是最重要．
當然，賠償我覺得李委員一定要爭取，但我希望您的每一步都可以把我之前提起的因素都可以考慮進去．
李立委加油．
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11591458
China, Japan and Taiwan
Profit over patriotism
Jun 19th 2008 | TAIPEI AND TOKYO
From The Economist print edition
A new geographical discovery in Asia: a “sea of peace and co-operation”
THE simmering dispute between China and Japan over the East China Sea has long been high on the list of possible regional flashpoints. It centres on China's development of undersea natural gas and oil deposits straddling what Japan says is the borderline between the two countries' exclusive economic zones. A deal announced on June 18th allows Japanese investment in Chinese projects in return for a profit-share. At the very least, the dispute has fallen down the flashpoint list.
There were small demonstrations against the deal in China. But they were a far cry from the wave of anti-Japanese protests three years ago, when the dispute looked potentially nasty. All the fields are estimated to hold gas equivalent to just three weeks' Japanese consumption but the government had protested loudly at the appearance of Chinese survey vessels and drilling platforms in the disputed area. Though on China's side, extraction might take gas from Japan's.
China ignored calls by Japan to suspend drilling. Planes and patrol vessels from both sides buzzed around the disputed areas. Later in 2005 a Chinese naval squadron appeared near the Chunxiao gasfield (known in Japanese as Shirakaba). One of the ships turned its gun turret on a Japanese reconnaissance plane. Japanese politicians condemned China's gunboat tactics and warned of the risk of conflict.
In endless rounds of negotiations since then, China and Japan have stepped back from the brink. The principle of the gasfields' joint development has long been agreed. But a deal seemed elusive. Intervention from the top was needed but took a long time coming. It followed a visit by Hu Jintao to Japan last month, the first in a decade by a Chinese president. Like Yasuo Fukuda, Japan's prime minister, he champions better bilateral relations. This week Japan announced that its navy is to make an unprecedented port call in China.
For Mr Fukuda, the gas deal presages a “sea of peace and co-operation”. In the Chunxiao field, Japan will form a joint venture with two Chinese state-owned companies, with profits split in proportion to their investment. Both sides have agreed that the Longjing field, which more certainly extends across the median line, will in future also be developed jointly, with costs and profits split. Agreement has yet to be reached on other fields.
The deal kicks matters of sovereignty down the road. The UN's Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises economic rights extending 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) from a country's shoreline. But the East China Sea is just 360 miles at its broadest. Japan claims its boundary as the median line. But China says its zone extends to the edge of the continental shelf, almost to Japan. The convention does not specify how to resolve overlapping claims.
Territorial matters remain prickly. A reminder came with the unintentional sinking on June 10th of a recreational fishing boat from Taiwan by a Japanese patrol vessel near the Senkaku islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese), which are controlled by Japan but claimed by Taiwan and China. The vessel picked up all 16 passengers and crew.
Given Taiwan's Chinese-imposed isolation, the island is keen to be on friendly terms with Japan, one of the few countries to grant Taiwanese visa-free entry. But over the Senkakus, Taiwanese show an emotional side. They were inflamed by Japan's claim that the Taiwanese skipper was to blame for the collision, and by only vague expressions of regret. The Taiwan government officially recalled its unofficial ambassador to Tokyo, deemed to be too pro-Japanese. And on June 16th nine Taiwanese patrol vessels escorted a boatful of nationalists into Japanese waters.
Mr Fukuda's government is playing the matter down. Admitting the coastguard was heavy-handed, it promised to ensure that legal claims for compensation ran smoothly. Japan's man in Taiwan called on the Taiwanese captain, but offered no formal apology. The matter may die down. But the Chinese have cheekily suggested to the Japanese the joint development of possible gasfields around the Senkakus, too—which would be sure to rile Taiwan.
中國還要跟日本後續聯合勘油了, 李教授,請跟我們說要如何處理呢? 仲裁,您覺得會有差別嗎? 唉,明年的聯合國談判我們是無法參與的了, 不知道現在該壓哪邊的寶才對.
李教授您好，有若干問題請教您，感恩！
1、台灣應該是非國際「法院」（ICJ）的締約國，同時也不再是聯合國的會員國，所以無法成為ICJ的當事國。此於聯合國憲章93條1、2兩項載有明文；復於國際法院規約第35條2項有進一步規定。
2、您文章中提到，我國船長可以ICC提出要求，由該組織的檢察官「逕行」調查。惟考量到ICC規約第5條載明的可受理案件情事，應該只有危害人道罪較有可能，但再看同規約第7條關於危害人道罪的定義，則日本撞擊我國海釣船（非漁船）的行為，顯然構成要件不該當。因此，檢察官能否「逕行」調查，恐有疑問，遑論ICC規約還有其它關於管轄權發動的「補充性質」之限制。
3、第四段第一句，關於用盡當地救濟原則的敘述，愚意感到略有理解的困難，能否懇請您稍作解釋。謝謝
4、我國雖於民國87年通過領海暨鄰接區法，但相關的領海基線起算點（官方承認之大比例尺海圖）迄今只由行政院公告過一次，且尚不完整。目前最近的實踐是，2004年內政部指示宜蘭縣政府將釣魚台及其降近島嶼劃入管轄，但日本提出抗議，並在2005年曾扣押我在此海域活動的我國籍漁船。
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